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The determinants of corruption at the individual level:
evidence from Bosnia-Herzegovina
Jasmina Mangafic and Ljiljan Veselinovic
School of Economics and Business, University of Sarajevo, Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina
ABSTRACT
This article uses data from the National Survey of Citizens’
Perceptions in Bosnia-Herzegovina to investigate the determinants
of offering a bribe in the form of money, gifts or services to med-
ical personnel, professors, judicial personnel, police officers and
public servants. We presented evidence about the spread of
corruption in these five sectors of the economy in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, and analysed the effects of determinants at the indi-
vidual level on the likelihood of engaging in bribery. Our results
confirmed that specific personal characteristics predicted corrupt
behaviour, but results varied across sectors. Logistic regression
was used to generate models from which predictions could be
made about the likelihood of an individual engaging in corrupt
behaviour. Our research shows that corruption is a widespread
phenomenon in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and more educated people,
people living in urban areas, and individuals with higher incomes
are more likely to engage in bribery in several sectors. Measures
and policies aimed at reducing corrupt behaviour should be
designed in a way that considers the specific characteristics of
these individuals.
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Corruption is one of the biggest challenges of the twenty-first century (OECD, 2015),
and can affect the investment climate, the effectiveness of public service, the quality
of education, and competencies (OECD, 2018). However, as Jiang (2017) notes, the
literature does not provide a consistent definition of corruption. This indicates that
diverse approaches have been taken to define the concept, leading to different conclu-
sions regarding the antecedents and consequences of corruption. Svensson (2005)
states that ‘a common definition of public corruption is the misuse of public office
for private gain’ (p. 20). In this paper, we define corruption as ‘behaviour which devi-
ates from the formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding (personal,
close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the
exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence’ (Nye, 1967, p. 419).
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Corruption is studied at different levels (Kaffenberger, 2012): cross-country, firm,
and micro. In this paper, we focus on corruption at the micro level. Olken and
Pande (2012) and Burguet, Ganuza, and Montalvo (2016) have reviewed microeco-
nomic studies related to corruption, and their results indicate that these studies typic-
ally utilise game theory and mechanism design in order to explain the behaviour of
bribers and bribees. The main empirical challenges involve the measures, determi-
nants and consequences of corruption. Studies at the cross-country level are wide-
spread. In fact, as Svensson (2003) and Reinikka and Svensson (2006) note, research
on the determinants of corruption typically takes the form of cross-country analysis
that utilises indices of the perception of corruption. Hietikko (2016, p. 17) observes
that ‘the existing literature on general determinants of corruption at the level of an
individual citizen or business is sparse compared to the work on cross-country meas-
ures’. Other studies (Islam & Lee, 2016; Razafindrakoto & Roubaud, 2007) also note
that studies based on micro-data have been comparatively rare. Our literature review
shows that micro-level corruption is measured differently across studies. Further, it
identifies a large number of determinants of corruption (age, gender, marital status,
household income, educational attainment, type of settlement and region), which vary
across contexts.
Bosnia-Herzegovina is divided into two entities, of which one is further divided
into ten cantons. This division of the country has enabled the decentralisation of
power, and Divjak and Pugh (2008) argue that such governance structures in Bosnia-
Herzegovina have facilitated political corruption. In addition to its complex govern-
mental structure, Bosnia-Herzegovina is facing growing challenges in the areas of
corruption, migration and unemployment. The intention to emigrate is highest
among those who are young, educated and come from low-income households
(Efendic, 2016). As Efendic (2016) notes, the Bosnian-Herzegovinian diaspora is
among the largest in Europe: 51% of the resident population lives abroad. The
unemployment rate is decreasing, but it is still high (35.0% according to administra-
tive data and 18.4% according to the annual Labour Force Survey), with a significant
number of workers in the informal sector (European Commission (EC), 2019). The
EC’s (2019) report shows that corruption is widespread in all sectors of the economy
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, affecting health, education, employment and public procure-
ment matters. As such, it remains an issue of concern. Additionally, the report
stresses the high public perception of corruption in the civil service, and the lack of
‘systemic and consolidated data on the practice of integrity of civil servants, both in
terms of questionnaires on self-declarations on civil service integrity and verification
of the integrity of the civil service’ (EC, 2019, p. 26). In that sense, Bosnia-
Herzegovina ‘… is at an early stage/has some level of preparation in the fight against
corruption’ (EC, 2019, p. 42). Corruption in post-conflict Bosnia-Herzegovina
remains rampant (Belloni & Strazzari, 2014). Belloni (2019, p. 64) states this expli-
citly: ‘In Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is widely believed, and frequently related to foreign
researchers, that even a cleaning job at the university has become a political appoint-
ment.’ Another example that illustrates the magnitude of the problem is found in the
health sector, where a bribe of approximately e125 is needed to receive reasonable
health care (Divjak & Pugh, 2008, p.383).
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This article focuses on bribery: a form of corruption where a reward is provided to
influence the judgement of a person in a position of trust. Our focus is on the
supply side of corruption. In order to discover what determines corruption, this paper
analyses information obtained from a sample of 3084 individuals in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, where 30.55% of respondents explicitly stated that they had been
involved in bribery in one or more of five distinct sectors of the economy. The
emphasis is on discovering the characteristics of the bribe giver, not of the person
collecting the bribe. In particular, the survey used in this research provides informa-
tion about whether individuals gave a bribe at least once in the form of money, gifts
or services to an individual in one of the following categories: doctors, nurses, profes-
sors, teachers, judges, court personnel, police officers, politicians, inspectors and gov-
ernment employees. To our knowledge, no prior studies on understanding the
determinants of micro-level corruption in the context of Bosnia-Herzegovina were
identified. Our aim is to examine whether the same individual characteristics increase
the likelihood of bribery across different sectors of an economy. In addition, we will
examine which individual characteristics have a statistically significant effect on the
absolute number of corruption experiences, a similar variable used by Gutmann,
Padovano, and Voigt (2014).
This article is structured as follows: (1) the theoretical background provides an
overview of what determines corruption at the individual level; (2) a detailed explan-
ation of data sources, variables and methods; (3) results and discussion and (4) con-
clusions and limitations.
2. Theoretical background
In the first part of the literature review, we present the most common empirical
approaches to measuring corruption at the micro level. Afterwards, we turn our
attention to the micro determinants of bribery.
2.1 Measures of corruption
Olken and Pande (2012) elaborate several methods that can estimate the magnitude
of corruption: perception-based measures; survey-based measures of bribes; estimates
from direct observation; graft estimation by subtraction and estimates from market
inference. Similarly, Burguet et al. (2016) provide broader categories for how corrup-
tion might be measured: a laboratory experiment on corruption; perceptions; direct
measures; and indirect methods. Each method has advantages and disadvantages in
its attempt to measure corruption, but the diversity of these methods leads to a het-
erogeneous estimation of its magnitude (Olken & Pande, 2012). Direct measures are
the best approach when observing corruption, but officials are rarely willing to par-
ticipate in this kind of research (Olken & Pande, 2012). Cross-country studies rely
mostly on the perception of corruption, but as Olken (2009) shows, actual corruption
does not correlate well with the perception of it. Questionnaires raise similar con-
cerns, especially around the high probability of under-reporting (Burguet et al., 2016).
In order to increase trust while reporting corruption, some studies (Svensson, 2003;
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Swamy, Knack, Lee & Azfar, 2001) designed the bribery question in a way that it
does not implicate respondents. Finally, experiments are difficult to justify, but they
reduce endogeneity concerns that might arise. As Armantier and Boly (2011)
note, using experiments to understand corruption is rare; only two field experiments
were published before 2011. One of these was Cameron, Chaudhuri, Erkal, and
Gangadharan’s (2009) use of an experimental methodology to analyse corrupt behav-
iour across four cultures. In this study, a total of 1935 subjects participated in 645
role-playing activities to test their susceptibility to corruption.
Table 1 shows studies relevant to our research. Deininger and Mpuga’s (2004) data
come from the Uganda National Integrity Survey, which covered 12,190 households.
Hunt (2004) and Hunt (2007a, 2007b) used a sample with over 40,000 observations
from 34 countries. Mocan (2008) analysed individual and country characteristics to
discover what determines corruption in a large sample (55,000 individuals from 30
countries), focussing on individual and country characteristics that could increase the
probability of being asked for a bribe. Hunt and Laszlo (2012) used Peruvian house-
hold surveys with over 18,000 observations, and the Ugandan Second National
Integrity Survey with over 12,000 household respondents. The dependent variable of
these studies represents exposure to bribery, typically measured by asking if any gov-
ernment official asked/expected an individual to pay a bribe for services. Ivlevs and
Table 1. Examples of dependent variables in the studies of individual-level corruption.
Study Dependent variable
Swamy et al. (2001) An individual is not corrupt if he/she says that bribery is never justified; otherwise he/
she is considered corrupt
Mangers (firm-level): ‘How frequently do the officials providing the service require
unofficial payments? Please answer on a scale of 1 to 7, where 1¼Never,
2¼ 1–20% of the time, 3¼ 21–40% of the time, 4¼ 41–60% of the time,
5¼ 61–80% of the time, 6¼ 81–99% of the time, and 7¼Always.’ (p. 35)
Hunt (2004),
Hunt (2007a)
‘In some countries, there is a problem of corruption among government or public
officials. During 199x, has any government official, for instance a customs officer, a
police officer or inspector in your country asked you, or expected you to pay a
bribe for his or her services?’ (p. 8.)
Deininger and
Mpuga (2004)
The direct indicator measuring if the household was required to pay a bribe in the
last six months, and if so the amount that was paid.




Reports of individuals indicating direct confrontation with corrupt officials and the
extent to which corruption is perceived as widespread.
Mocan (2008) ‘During [the past year] has any government official, for instance, a customs officer,
police officer or inspector in your own country, asked you or expected you to pay
a bribe for his services?’ (p. 4)
Hunt and Laszlo (2012) One adult per household is asked if the official required a bribe or if the respondent
felt obliged to bribe.
Hernandez and
McGee (2013)
‘The question asked whether the respondent believed that accepting a bribe in the
course of one’s duties was justifiable. Responses were measured on a 10-point
Likert scale where 1 is never justifiable and 10 is always justifiable.’ (p. 913)
Gutmann
et al. (2014)
Corruption perception measures the degree of corruption in twelve types of
organisation. Corruption perception represents the mean value of the eight
government agency specific perception indicators
Ivlevs and
Hinks (2015)
Engagement in bribery is gathered by asking: has ‘… any member of your
household [made] an unofficial payment or gift when using these services over the
past 12 months?’
Liu and Peng (2015) ‘How much did you or your parents spend on personal connections with the
examiners and admissions workers?’ (p. 176)
Source: Authors.
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Hinks (2015) studied individual-level determinants of bribing public officials in thirty
countries in Central Europe, Eastern Europe, Central Asia and Western Europe, with
around 1000 respondents from each country. The dependent variable was measured
by asking if any member of the household had made an unofficial payment for one
or more of eight types of public service over the past 12months. Torgler and Valev
(2006) used the data from the World Values Survey to analyse micro-data from more
than 50 countries, with 1000 individuals in each national representative sample. The
dependent variable measures the justifiability of corruption using the ten-scale index.
The measure used in the research has a statistically significant correlation with the
Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (r¼ 0.36). Razafindrakoto
and Roubaud (2007) used micro-level data from 18 sub-Saharan African countries.
Exposure to corruption was measured by several variables, including reports of
individuals indicating confrontation with corrupt officials, and the extent to which
individuals perceived corruption as widespread. Swamy et al. (2001) analysed two
samples: (1) individuals from World Values Surveys (18 surveys in 1981; 43 surveys
in 1990–1991); and (2) managers from 350 firms in Georgia. Individuals are not con-
sidered corrupt if they say that bribery is never justified; otherwise, they are consid-
ered to be corrupt. The outcome variable of interest in the case of managers is
measured on a scale from one to seven. It explains how often officials providing the
service require unofficial payments. Liu and Peng (2015) used only 1541 of the 2,780
questionnaires they collected from art students in 139 colleges across China. Their
dependent variable offered five options with which to check how much a respond-
ent’s parents spent on personal connections with the employees of colleges. The ques-
tion was recorded in binary if spending was evident. Gutmann, Padovano, and Voigt
(2014) conducted research on 257,375 individual-level observations from 11 countries,
with a dependent variable representing corruption perception.
2.2. Determinants of micro-level corruption
This literature review focuses primarily on micro determinants: more precisely what
determines corruption at an individual level. The emphasis is on discovering the
characteristics of the bribe giver, not of the person collecting the bribe. In other
words, to understand the determinants of the willingness to bribe, we analyse the
supply side of corruption. After collecting articles, we collated the significant predic-
tors of bribery at an individual level in Table 2.
2.2.1. Age
Age is a significant predictor of bribery. Although these results are difficult to com-
pare as different age group categories are used in different studies, young individuals
are generally more likely to engage in bribery (Ivlevs & Hinks, 2015; Hernandez &
McGee, 2013). Individuals who are 20–39 years of age are more likely to bribe than
older individuals and those younger than 20 (Mocan, 2008). Torgler and Valev’s
(2006) results show that individuals between 30 and 65 are more likely to justify cor-
ruption than respondents younger than 30. Their sample consisted of more than 50
countries, among which the age effect was higher in the regions of Central and
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Eastern Europe, the Former Soviet Union, and Latin America. The results of
Hernandez and McGee’s (2013) study show that ‘people tend to become more
opposed to bribery as they get older’ (p. 913). Similarly, according to Hunt (2004),
older people pay fewer bribes because of trust networks. However, age does not
have a statistically significant association with corruption in most countries in
Razafindrakoto and Roubaud’s (2007) study. Gutmann et al. (2014) show that indi-
viduals between 30 and 50 report a higher perception of corruption than younger or
older individuals, illustrating an inverse U-shape between age and perception. In line
with this discussion, our first research question is: Is age consistently associated with
a higher probability of bribing in five sectors of the economy?
2.2.2. Gender
In most studies (Cameron et al., 2009; Mocan, 2008; Razafindrakoto & Roubaud,
2007; Swamy et al., 2001; Torgler & Valev, 2006, Deininger & Mpuga, 2004), males
Table 2. Significant predictors of individual-level corruption.
Significant
predictor More likely to engage in bribery, or evidence to the contrary
Age Individuals who are 20–39 years of age (Mocan, 2008); Individuals who are 30–65
years of age (Torgler & Valev, 2006); Individuals who are 34–45 years of age (Ivlevs
& Hinks, 2015); Individuals who are 30–50 years of age reported a higher
corruption perception (Gutmann et al., 2014); Younger individuals (Hernandez &
McGee, 2013; Hunt, 2004)
Gender Males (Hernandez & McGee, 2013; Cameron et al., 2009; Mocan, 2008; Razafindrakoto
& Roubaud, 2007; Torgler & Valev, 2006; Swamy et al., 2001); Male-headed
households (Deininger & Mpuga, 2004); Females reported a higher perception of
corruption (Gutmann et al., 2014); No evidence that females engage less in bribery
(Liu & Peng, 2015; Ivlevs & Hinks, 2015)
Marital status Married individuals (Mocan, 2008; Swamy et al., 2001); Single individuals (Torgler &
Valev, 2006)
Income Individuals with a higher income (Mocan, 2008; Ivlevs & Hinks, 2015; Deininger &
Mpuga, 2004); The poorest individuals (Islam & Lee, 2016; Razafindrakoto &
Roubaud, 2007); Students from middle-income families (Liu & Peng, 2015); Rich
individuals are more likely to bribe than poor ones (Hunt & Laszlo, 2012); Richer
patients (Hunt, 2007b); Corruption perception falls with an increase in income
(Gutmann et al., 2014);
No evidence: Economic status and financial satisfaction do not have a statistically
significant association with the justifiability of corruption (Torgler & Valev, 2006).
Education Highly educated individuals (Mocan, 2008; Razafindrakoto & Roubaud, 2007);
Individuals with less knowledge about how to report corruption (Deininger &
Mpuga, 2004); A less educated head of household, and girls studying at school
(Islam & Lee, 2016);
No evidence: No statistically significant association of education with the
justifiability of corruption (Torgler & Valev, 2006), bribery (Ivlevs & Hinks, 2015), or
the perception of corruption (Gutmann et al., 2014)
Large cities Individuals living in large cities (Mocan, 2008); Individuals living in larger communities
(Hunt, 2004); Rural respondents (Deininger & Mpuga, 2004); Individuals in regions
with fewer residents of their own age (Hunt, 2004)
Region The respondent is from a certain region (Torgler & Valev, 2006)
Employment status &
occupation




People with higher confidence in public institutions (Ivlevs & Hinks, 2015); The level
of trust between the briber and the corrupt official can, depending on the country,
reduce or increase the probability of a bribe being requested (Razafindrakoto &
Roubaud, 2007); A high level of trust does not necessarily reduce corruption, but
individuals with absolute trust in the accountability of public servants are less
likely to bribe (Liu & Peng, 2015)
Source: Authors.
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or male-headed households were more likely to engage in or justify bribery.
According to Mocan (2008), possible explanations for this include a higher activity
level of males in the labour market, which increases the frequency of their contact
with government officials. However, Torgler and Valev’s (2006) explanation is that
men have lower norms regarding bribery. In addition, females report a higher level of
corruption perception (Gutmann et al., 2014). However, two studies (Liu & Peng,
2015; Ivlevs & Hinks, 2015) found no evidence that females engage in bribery less
than men. Hernandez and McGee (2013) show that men and women justified bribery
equally until 2006, but that males have become more inclined to do so since.
Although these are country-level data, recent research by Debski and Jetter (2015)
shows that the relationship between gender and corruption raises doubts once coun-
try-specific unobservable differences in history or culture are acknowledged. In line
with this discussion, our second research question is: Is gender consistently associated
with a higher probability of bribing in five sectors of the economy?
2.2.3. Marital status
Married individuals are at higher risk of being exposed to bribery compared with sin-
gle individuals (Mocan, 2008). Mocan (2008) points out that these single individuals
‘may have to deal with government rules and regulations less frequently’ (p. 8).
However, we could argue that this effect is present because of the pressure of their
social network (Torgler & Valev, 2006; Tittle, 1980), or because of how marriage
modifies the behaviour of individuals in public (Swamy et al., 2001). Torgler and
Valev (2006) show contrary results that indicate married people have a lower toler-
ance for corruption. They explain it by saying married individuals have a higher
social norm regarding bribery than other marital statuses. In line with this discussion,
our third research question is: Is marital status consistently associated with a higher
probability of bribing in five sectors of the economy?
2.2.4. Income
Income is another important predictor of micro-level corruption. Individuals with
higher incomes (Mocan, 2008; Ivlevs & Hinks, 2015), rich individuals (Hunt &
Laszlo, 2012), affluent households, and households with higher levels of consumption
(Deininger & Mpuga, 2004) are more likely to engage in bribery. However, contrary
results obtained by Razafindrakoto and Roubaud (2007) show that the poorest indi-
viduals are ‘more vulnerable and less able to avoid or resist bureaucratic corruption’
(p. 14). Similar results were obtained by Islam and Lee (2016). Liu and Peng (2015)
found that students from middle-income families were more likely to bribe. However,
in Torgler and Valev’s (2006) study, economic status and financial satisfaction do not
have a statistically significant association with the justifiability of corruption. The
underlying explanation for the positive association of higher income with corruption
likely relates to this group’s higher frequency of interaction with the government
(Mocan, 2008). Gutmann et al. (2014) found that corruption perception decreases
with an increase in income. At the macro level, richer countries are strongly associ-
ated with lower corruption levels (Debski & Jetter, 2015). In line with this discussion,
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our fourth research question is: Is household income consistently associated with a
higher probability of bribing in five sectors of the economy?
2.2.5. Education
More educated individuals are more likely to engage in bribery (Mocan, 2008;
Razafindrakoto & Roubaud, 2007). The underlying explanation for this finding is
most likely that highly educated individuals have more frequent interactions with
government officials (Mocan, 2008; Razafindrakoto & Roubaud, 2007). However, indi-
viduals who are well informed or better integrated into society might be encouraged
to envisage corrupt practices that are reported in the media (Razafindrakoto &
Roubaud, 2007). Conversely, Torgler and Valev (2006) found no statistically signifi-
cant association between education and justifiability of corruption, although they
expected that educated individuals might be more familiar with, and knowledgeable
about, government activities, which might impact their assessment of justifiability of
corruption. It was expected that educated individuals might better understand oppor-
tunities for corruption, but no evidence was found to support this claim. Similarly,
Ivlevs and Hinks (2015) did not find a statistically significant association between
education and corruption behaviour, and Gutmann et al. (2014) did not associate
education with perception of corruption. Interestingly, individuals with less know-
ledge about how to report corruption were less likely to take bribes (Deininger &
Mpuga, 2004). An educated individual’s field of study can be associated with a higher
probability of bribing. The study that implemented the experimental design
(Cameron et al., 2009) came to the conclusion that individuals who study economics
are more likely to accept bribes. However, as Torgler and Valev (2006) point out, the
relationship between education and corruption is not clear, as there is an evident lack
of empirical studies at the micro level. In line with this discussion, our fifth research
question is: Is educational attainment consistently associated with a higher probability
of bribing in the five sectors of the economy?
2.2.6. Type of settlement and region
Mocan (2008) concludes that living in a large city might increase opportunities to interact
with government officials; living in a large city creates fewer personal interactions. People
from larger communities pay more bribes than individuals from smaller communities
because individuals from smaller communities can more easily establish trust networks
(Hunt, 2004). However, Deininger and Mpuga (2004) conclude that individuals from
rural areas are significantly more likely to bribe than those living in urban areas. Torgler
and Valev’s (2006) results show that individuals living in certain regions can justify cor-
ruption more than individuals in other regions, thus concluding that the ‘social norm
regarding bribery is unambiguously higher in Western Europe, the U.S., and Australia’
(p. 9). According to Hunt (2004), individuals living in regions with many residents of
their own age pay fewer bribes. In line with this discussion, our sixth research question
is: Does the type of settlement (urban/rural) in which an individual lives increase the
probability of bribing across the five sectors of the economy? Finally, we wanted to test
whether regional differences increased the probability of an individual to bribe.
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2.2.7. Other explanatory variables
In the public sector, Gutmann et al.’s (2014) results show that corruption experience
impacts an individual’s perception of corruption. Torgler and Valev’s (2006) results
show that self-employed and unemployed individuals are more likely to justify a
bribe, while unemployed and retired persons reported lower perception levels than
employed individuals (Gutmann et al., 2014). Individuals in certain occupations (such
as business people and professionals) are significantly less likely to bribe than farmers
(Deininger & Mpuga, 2004). Ethnic minorities are more likely to pay bribes because
of their concentration in a specific sector, their higher vulnerability, or even their
connection to former political elites (Ivlevs & Hinks, 2015). Liu and Peng (2015) con-
clude that personal characteristics influence the willingness to bribe. Their study
identifies several important predictors of bribery: the perceived level of corruption;
personal attitudes towards corruption; academic attainment; and the rank of a college.
An interesting explanatory variable that has been shown to increase the risk of an
individual being asked to bribe is the lack of knowledge about the procedures for
reporting corruption (Deininger & Mpuga, 2004). This indicates the focus of corrup-
tion prevention should be on improved accountability. Significantly, Hunt (2007a)
found that ‘victims of misfortune, particularly crime victims, are much more likely
than non-victims to bribe public officials’ (p. 2).
3. Data and models
This article uses the National Survey of Citizens’ Perceptions of Bosnia and
Herzegovina (NSCP-BiH). The third round of the NSCP-BiH was financed by
USAID/BiH and was conducted in 2017 by IMPAQ International, under the
Monitoring and Evaluation Support Activity (MEASURE-BIH). The sampling was
based on probability or representative sampling, ensuring a nationally representative
sample. The response rate for NSCP-BiH 2017 was 64%. A total of 3084 responses
from individuals older than 18 years were collected in a face-to-face computer-assisted
personal interviewing survey. As such, this sample is nationally representative and
sufficiently large. This section provides a detailed explanation of variables employed
in modelling, sampling characteristics, and techniques used for data analysis.
Table 3 presents the characteristics of the entire sample. Women are slightly over-
represented in the sample (56.06% of the total sample size). The largest group com-
prises individuals older than 55 years (34.86%), while respondents in other age
groups are equally distributed. Most survey participants were married (59.08%), with
single individuals representing 26.13% of the total sample. Secondary education was
the most frequent level of education completed by survey participants (59.34%), fol-
lowed by primary education (24.71%). The representation of respondents in the three
major ethnic groups was: Bosniaks (55.12%), Serbs (32.49%) and Croats (8.95%).
About 73% of the data concerning the occupation of individuals is missing. The
most common occupations recorded were those in services and retail (6.00% of the
total sample size), and elementary occupations (4.47%). Most survey participants
reported the monthly net income of their household to be below 500 BAM (21.98%
of the total sample), or between 500 and 1000 BAM (21.73% of the total sample).
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The proportion of respondents who have given bribes is presented in Table 4.
Based on these results, we can observe the following: (a) women were less likely than
men to give a bribe; (b) the likelihood of giving a bribe increased with age (excluding
participants above 55 years), and in households with a higher monthly net income;
(c) married individuals were more likely to give a bribe than single and divorced
individuals; (d) survey participants with secondary education were more likely to give
a bribe than those with a lower or higher level of education; and (e) Serbs were more
likely to report giving a bribe than Bosniaks and Croats, and Croats were more likely
to report giving a bribe than Bosniaks. Technicians, associate professionals, legislators,
senior officials and chief executives were the occupations with the highest occurrences
of bribery (over 40% of the total number of respondents in the corresponding occu-
pation). Additional analyses show that there are differences in a respondent’s age,
marital status, monthly net household income and level of education that can indicate
whether or not they have ever given a bribe. Therefore, these variables might be sig-
nificant predictors of corruption.




Total Total sample size 3084 100.00
Gender Male 1355 43.9
Female 1729 56.1





Marital status Single 806 26.1
Married 1822 59.1
Divorced, widower or in a cohabiting partnership 456 14.8
The highest level of
education completed
Less than secondary education 762 24.7
Secondary education 1830 59.3
More than secondary education 492 16.0
Ethnicity Bosniak 1700 55.1
Croat 276 9.0
Serb 1002 32.5
Other, Did not declare, or Missing 106 3.4
Current occupation Legislators, senior officials and chief executives 18 0.6
Scientists, engineers and other professionals 108 3.5
Technicians and associate professionals 122 4.0
Clerical support workers 96 3.1
Service and sales workers 185 6.0
Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers 10 0.3
Craft and related trades workers 62 2.0
Plant and machine operators and assemblers 71 2.3
Elementary occupations 138 4.5
Armed forces occupations 14 0.5




No income in this month 87 2.8
1–500 BAM 591 19.2
501–1000 BAM 670 21.7
>1000 BAM 388 12.6
Does not know/Refuses to answer 1348 43.7
Source: Authors.
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Due to large amounts of missing data in each occupation category (only 32%
respondents of the sample were employed, or 59% when students and retired persons
were excluded), the occupational variable is not included in our models. We ran sev-
eral logistic regression models with a series of occupational dummies, but this
resulted in a large amount of missing data in all models. For this reason, we pro-
ceeded without this variable.
We specified six models. In the first five, our dependent variable has the value
‘one’ if the respondent had to give money, gifts, services, or similar in exchange for
better treatment from an employee in one of the following categories: medical per-
sonnel, teachers, judicial personnel, police officers, or public servants. Bribes were
mainly given to doctors (26.9%), followed by nurses (23.1%) and police officers
(16.8%). The other two types of bribery are less common, and their occurrences are
below 4% of respondents in the sample (Table 5). The correlation between a bribe
given to a doctor and that given to a nurse is very strong (r¼ 0.726, p< 0.05), sug-
gesting that interaction with doctors might also require interaction with nurses.




Total number of respondents who gave
at least one type of bribe
939 30.5
Gender Male 454 33.5
Female 485 28.1





Marital status Single 214 26.6
Married 585 32.1
Divorced, widower/Widow or in a cohabiting partnership 140 30.7
The highest level of
education completed
Less than secondary education 207 27.2
Secondary education 598 32.7
More than secondary education 134 27.2
Ethnicity Bosniak 488 28.7
Croat 86 31.2
Serb 331 33.0
Other or Did not declare 34 32.1
Current occupation Legislators, senior officials and chief executives 8 44.4
Scientists, engineers and other professionals 30 27.8
Technicians and associate professionals 60 49.2
Clerical support workers 28 29.2
Service and sales workers 66 35.7
Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers 2 20.0
Craft and related trades workers 23 37.1
Plant and machine operators and assemblers 25 35.2
Elementary occupations 48 34.8
Armed forces occupations 5 35.7




No income in this month 23 26.4
1–500 BAM 162 27.4
501–1000 BAM 215 32.1
>1000 BAM 157 40.5
Does not know/Refuses to answer 382 28.3
Source: Authors.
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There is a moderate positive linear relationship between bribes given to the follow-
ing groups in the sample: politician and inspector (r¼ 0.626, p< 0.05); politician
and government employee (r¼ 0.590, p< 0.05); and inspector and government
employee (r¼ 0.551, p< 0.05). These categories represent a similar broader group
(public servants), indicating that individuals who interact with one group might
also need to interact with another. Respondents involved in giving a bribe to politi-
cians might have a higher probability of interacting with and bribing inspectors and
government employees. Finally, the correlation between judge/prosecutor and court
personnel is moderately strong (r¼ 0.58, p< 0.05). In order to improve the predict-
ability of our models, we aggregated these ten types of bribe into five categories, as
shown in Table 5.
In the sixth model, the dependent variable represents the absolute number of cor-
ruption experiences. A similar approach to capture corruption experience was used
by Gutmann et al. (2014). In our case, corruption experience measures the number of
sectors in which an individual was involved in bribery. For example, if an individual
was involved in bribing teachers and police officers, the absolute number of corrup-
tion experiences is two. There were 436 missing data (14.1%) because these partici-
pants did not answer the question about their involvement in some form of
corruption. A total of 1709 respondents (55.4%) did not participate in bribery at all.
However, 939 individuals (30.45%) provided gifts or money to the previously identi-
fied categories of bribe-takers. About 2% of respondents were involved in more than
five types of bribery.
Starting with the predictors of corruption identified in the literature, we outlined a
list of variables in our models (Table 6). We included demographic variables for
which most of the data were not missing.
Logistic regression is used to generate models from which predictions can be made
about the likelihood of an individual to give bribes. We used STATA 15.1 to fit a
Table 5. Dependent variables.
Have you ever given money, gifts,
services, or similar to any of the following
in exchange for better treatment?
Yes No Does not know
Medical personnel 918 (29.8%) 2006 (65.1%) 160a (5.2%)
Doctors 831 (26.9%) 2124 (68.9%) 129 (4.2%)
Nurses 711 (23.1%) 2228 (72.2%) 145 (4.7%)
Teachers 109 (3.5%) 2818 (91.4%) 157 (5.1%)
Judicial personnel 132 (4.3%) 2777 (90.1%) 175 (5.7%)
Judges/prosecutors 92 (3.0%) 2837 (92.0%) 155 (5.0%)
Court personnel 90 (2.9%) 2842 (92.2%) 152 (4.9%)
Police officers 517 (16.8%) 2416 (78.3%) 151 (4.9%)
Public servants 308 (10.0%) 2584 (83.8%) 192 (6.2%)
Politicians 94 (3.0%) 2859 (92.7%) 131 (4.2%)
Inspectors 123 (4.0%) 2825 (91.6%) 136 (4.4%)
Government employees 82 (2.7%) 2859 (92.7%) 143 (4.6%)
Other public officials 209 (6.8%) 2731 (88.6%) 144 (4.7%)
Source: Authors.
aThe larger number of respondents in the aggregated category than in subcategories is due to missing data: if a
respondent indicated that they had never given a bribe to a doctor, but did not answer the question about bribing
a nurse, we could not claim that this respondent fell within the two previous categories.
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logit model with a binary outcome variable (maximum-likelihood estimation). We
reported the odds ratio Exp(B) to show the change in odds that results from a unit
change in the variable of interest. The odds ratio provides a more intuitive way to
interpret effects. Collinearity diagnostics were performed to detect potential issues
with multicollinearity. All variance inflation factors (VIF) values were below five, and
all tolerance levels above 0.2, suggesting no issues with multicollinearity. In Table 7,
we reported the mean VIF values for our models. In order to test how well our mod-
els fit the data, we used the Hosmer–Lemeshow goodness of fit test. The test indi-
cated that all logistic regression models, except Model 3 (Judicial personnel), fit the
data well. The model fit in Model 3 was significantly improved after removing
regional dummies (cantons), but as we did not observe any changes in the coeffi-
cients we presented the original model with regional dummies. However, the results
of Model 3 should be interpreted with caution.
4. Results
Since the parameters in each case have different meanings in terms of magnitude, we
first presented the means of dependent variables. The most frequent form of corrup-
tion is that of bribing medical personnel: almost 30% of survey participants reported
that they had done this. A small percentage of individuals had bribed teachers (3.5%)
and judicial personnel (4.3%). Incidences of corruption in other sectors lie between
these boundaries. Almost 17% of survey participants reported that they had bribed a
police officer, and 10% reported that they had bribed a public servant. In comparison,
the study in Uganda (Deininger & Mpuga, 2004) reported that law enforcement is
the most corrupted sector (36% users had paid bribes), followed by the health sector
(21%), local administration (15%) and education (7%). In both contexts, bribery in
Table 6. Model specifications.
Model
Outcome variable: Have you ever given money,
gifts, services, or similar to any of the
following in exchange for better treatment? Explanatory variables




Gender (51 if Male)
Marital status: Single (ref.), Married,
Divorced, Widower (¼1 if Yes)
Monthly net household income:
Low (0–500 BAM), Middle
(501–1000 BAM), High (>1000)
Level of Education:
No education (ref.)





Rural settlement & 13 regions (dummies)
Model 2 Teachers (Yes/No)
Teaching staff at primary or secondary
schools, or at universities (Yes/No)
Model 3 Judicial personnel (Yes/No)
Judges/prosecutors (Yes/No)
Court personnel (Yes/No)
Model 4 Police officers (Yes/No)
Police officers (Yes/No)




Other public officials (Yes/No)
Model 6 Corruption Experience
Source: Authors.
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the education sector is relatively low, and the spread of bribing in the health sector is
similar. A study based on data from 34 countries (Hunt, 2004) reported higher rates
of bribery than those in Bosnia-Herzegovina: 12% of respondents had paid a bribe to
a public official; 24% to a government official; and 34% to a police officer.
In Table 5, we present the coefficients and their significance values in six models
for the purpose of comparing results across sectors. Only individuals who answered
‘Yes’ or ‘No’ to each question regarding involvement in corruption are included in
the analysis. Individuals that did not answer, or did not know the answer, were
excluded as we cannot know for sure that they participated in bribery.
We reported (pseudo) R2 as it is the STATA’s default output. However, measuring
the overall fit in logistic regression is not as straightforward as in linear regression
(Studenmund, 2016). Field (2009, p. 269) states that there is controversy regarding an
adequate analogue to the R2 when using logistic regression. Razafindrakoto and
Roubaud (2007) reported a relatively low pseudo R2 for some of their models with a
low R2 (below 12%). Swamy et al. (2001) reported their pseudo R2 to be 16.5%,
whereas Hunt and Laszlo (2012) reported it in a range from 4% to 31%. Other stud-
ies have reported a relatively low R2: between 20% and 25% (Ivlevs & Hinks, 2015)
and between 9% and 17% (Hunt, 2004). However, yet other studies (Deininger &
Mpuga, 2004; Torgler & Valev, 2006; Mocan, 2008; Liu & Peng, 2015) do not report
a pseudo R2, but rather a log-likelihood.
4.1. Age
A statistically significant association between a respondent’s age and engagement in
bribery exists only in cases of bribing teachers/professors. On average, odds for
respondents older than 55 years are 74% lower than those for respondents in the
18–24 age group. We found no statistically significant association between the other
three age groups and the bribing of teachers. We also employed age as a continuous
variable, and found that with each year of increase in a respondent’s age, there was
an approximately 3% decrease in the odds of them bribing teachers/professors. The
age of the respondent was not a significant predictor of bribery within other sectors
of the economy.
4.2. Gender and marital status
Overall, gender and marital status did not have a statistically significant association
with bribing in most sectors of the economy. However, gender and one marital sta-
tus (widower) were found to have a statistically significant association with bribing
police officers. The odds that males will engage in bribing police officers are 146%
higher than those for females. This is in line with most studies of determinants of
micro-level corruption (Cameron et al., 2009; Mocan, 2008; Razafindrakoto &
Roubaud, 2007; Torgler & Valev, 2006; Deininger & Mpuga, 2004; Swamy et al.,
2001): males or male-headed households are more likely to engage in or justify
bribery. Odds for widowers are 62% lower than those for singles. We also found
that marital status has a significant effect on the bribery of judicial personnel. The
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odds for married individuals are 48% lower than those for singles, but are still sig-
nificant at 10%. The literature contains mixed results; our results are in line with
Torgler and Valev’s (2006) results, but contradict those of Mocan (2008). In our
Model 6, involvement in various bribing activities was higher for male than female
respondents.
4.3. Household income
Respondents with a higher income (more than 1000 BAM/month) are significantly
more likely to engage in bribing in three out of five bribery categories than respond-
ents in the low-income group. On average, the odds that respondents with a high
income will engage in bribing medical personnel, police officers and public servants
are 67, 107, and 51% higher than the odds for respondents with a low income,
respectively. Belonging to a middle-income household has no statistically significant
association with bribing of any type. In Model 6, high income has statistically signifi-
cant influences on corruption experiences, indicating that they will be higher for
respondents with a high income than for those with a low one.
4.4. Education
A statistically significant association between some levels of education and the bribing
of officials are found in three out of five models. In terms of the percentage change
in those models, we found that the odds that respondents with higher levels of educa-
tion will engage in bribing activities are higher than those for respondents with no
education at all. The odds that respondents with a primary education will offer bribes
to medical personnel, police officers and public servants are 75, 238 and 269% higher
than those for respondents with no education, respectively. Similarly, the odds that
respondents with secondary education will offer bribes to the same bribe-takers are
68, 335 and 523% higher than those for respondents with no education, respectively.
The odds for respondents with post-secondary education are higher than those of our
reference group in only two categories of bribe-taker: police officers (226% higher,
but significant at 10%), and public servants (618% higher). Finally, respondents with
university degrees have higher odds for bribing police officers (175% higher, signifi-
cant at 10%) and public servants (618% higher, significant at 10%). In our sixth
Model, only secondary education has a statistically positive effect on corruption
experience, indicating that the latter is higher for respondents with secondary educa-
tion than for those with only primary education.
4.5. Type of settlement and regions
Respondents from rural areas were significantly less likely to offer a bribe to teachers,
judicial personnel, police officers and public servants than participants from an urban
area. The odds of engaging in these bribe categories if respondents are from rural
areas are between 27% and 61% lower than those for respondents from an urban
area. Respondents from Herzegovina-Neretva Canton and West Herzegovina Canton
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were found to engage significantly more in bribery activities in several sectors than
those from the reference group (Una-Sana Canton). The odds ratios for these two
cantons are unusually high compared to other odds ratios. In addition, we observed
that the odds of respondents bribing police officers in 6 out of the 12 regions were
lower than those for respondents from our reference region. In Model 6, we identi-
fied five cantons with a significant influence on the dependent variable: Tuzla
Canton, Central Bosnia Canton, Herzegovina-Neretva Canton, West Herzegovina
Canton, and Bosnian-Podrinje Canton. We can say that corruption experience will be
higher for respondents from Herzegovina-Neretva Canton and West Herzegovina
Canton than for those from Una-Sana Canton. On the other hand, corruption experience
is lower for respondents from Tuzla, Central Bosnia and Bosnian-Podrinje Cantons.
5. Discussion
In this article, we aimed to analyse the consistency of predictors of bribery across sec-
tors. We found several statistically significant but inconsistent predictors in five sec-
tors: health, education, justice, police, and government. We also presented the
important predictors of corruption experience: that is, overall involvement in different
forms of bribery. Our models show that income, education and type of settlement
play an important role in predicting corrupt behaviour at the individual level, but
only in several sectors. Additionally, gender is an important predictor of corruption
experiences.
Understanding corruption and its potential predictors are essential in order to bet-
ter support anti-corruption policies. Jancsics (2019, p. 2) argues that more effective
anti-corruption strategies can be developed if ‘we specify exactly what we understand
about different types of corruption’. In essence, our five forms of bribery are cases of
need corruption: an individual decides to bribe in order to receive appropriate serv-
ices or to avoid hassle. However, inconsistent results across sectors support the fact
that although need corruption is common to all individuals regardless of their socio-
demographic characteristics, a certain individual’s characteristics can increase or
decrease the probability of bribery. Hence, significant predictors can determine an
individual’s state in terms of age, gender, education level or income, when the need
to bribe in exchange for services is more likely to occur.
Corruption is a worrying (EC, 2019) and widespread (Belloni, 2019) problem in
Bosnia-Herzegovina. As in Bulgaria, the high involvement in corruption of individu-
als in different sectors of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s economy may indicate that ‘the cor-
ruption does not violate social norms but has rather become the norm itself’
(Pavlovska-Hilaiel, 2015, p. 204). Placek, Půcek, and Ochrana (2019) argue that fac-
tors specific to post-communist countries might be important in understanding cor-
ruption; that is, bribing officials had been a way to satisfy the needs of an individual
in times of scarcity, both on the demand and supply sides of corruption. Such
corrupt behaviour is still ‘deeply rooted in the consciousness of the citizens of post-
communist countries’ (Placek, Půcek, & Ochrana, 2019, p. 13). In line with this, we
argue that corruption is an inherited lifestyle in Bosnia-Herzegovina, regardless of
age, marital status or gender in most sectors of the economy, although having a
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higher income and higher level of education increases the probability of bribery in
several sectors.
Nevertheless, it is worth discussing several statistically significant predictors of
bribery. Type of settlement is the most consistent predictor across sectors, indicating
that people living in urban areas are more likely to bribe teachers, judicial personnel,
police officers and public servants, and to have a higher corruption experience. As
Hunt (2004) notes, people from larger communities pay more bribes than those from
smaller ones, because it is easier for individuals in smaller communities to establish
trust networks. Additionally, living in a large city can increase an individual’s likeli-
hood to interact with government officials (Mocan, 2008). We argue that both trust
networks and an increased need for interactions with government officials are import-
ant in understanding our results. However, no significant results were obtained regard-
ing the bribing of medical personnel. This might indicate that bribing medical
personnel demonstrates the prevalence of need corruption in both rural and urban
areas, since individuals are expected to bribe to receive adequate health care (Divjak &
Pugh, 2008). The same reasoning applies to other sectors, but individuals from rural
areas have a lower need for such interventions due to established trust networks.
Education and income are found to be important predictors of corruption in three
sectors. Secondary education and high income are positively associated with corrup-
tion experience. Our results regarding education are in line with those of Mocan
(2008) and Razafindrakoto and Roubaud (2007), and suggest that more educated
individuals are more likely to engage in bribery. In terms of high income, our results
are in line with those of previous studies (Mocan, 2008; Ivlevs & Hinks, 2015; Hunt
& Laszlo, 2012; Deininger & Mpuga, 2004). As all these corrupted practices are cases
of need corruption, an individual with a higher education or higher income bribes to
receive appropriate services. As Torgler and Valev (2006) note, more educated people
can better assess the justifiability of corruption, which leads to a higher engagement
in bribery activities. However, Mocan (2008) argues that more educated individuals
and individuals with higher incomes interact with officials more often. As the illegal
act of bribing is more likely to be enacted by educated individuals and individuals
with a higher income, policy-makers should address this issue according to the socio-
demographic specificities of these categories. However, such discussion is beyond the
scope of this article.
Gender, marital status and age were found to be statistically significant predictors
of corruption in only one sector each: the oldest individuals are less involved in brib-
ing teachers; males are more involved in bribing police officers, and are more likely
to have a higher corruption experience; and widowers are less involved in bribing
police officers. In line with Mocan (2008), males are more active outside the home.
As expected, in Bosnia-Herzegovina males are more likely to drive a car, but they
also refuse to wear a seat belt more frequently than females (Lipovac, Tesic, Maric, &
-Deric, 2015). Hence, they are more often in a situation in which they need to bribe
police officers in order to avoid sanctions or paying larger fines. Finally, similarly to
those of Razafindrakoto and Roubaud (2007), our results could not associate age with
a higher likelihood of bribing in most sectors, indicating that corruption is a wide-
spread problem regardless of age.
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6. Conclusion
This study analyses the determinants of micro-level corruption in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Accordingly, we presented evidence about the spread of corruption in
five sectors of the country’s economy. Further, we analysed the effects of determi-
nants at the individual level on the likelihood of engaging in bribery. Our results con-
firm that specific personal characteristics predict corrupt behaviour, but results vary
across sectors. These inconsistencies support the fact that need corruption is common
to all individuals regardless of their socio-demographic characteristics, although a par-
ticular individual’s characteristics can increase or decrease the probability of bribery.
We found several statistically significant predictors in the following sectors of the
economy: medical personnel (income, education); teachers (age, rural settlement);
judicial personnel (married, rural settlement); police officers (gender, widower,
income, education, rural settlement) and public servants (income, education, rural
settlement). Gender, income, education and rural settlement are associated with cor-
ruption experiences. Overall, our models show that income, education and type of
settlement play an important role in predicting corrupt behaviour at the individ-
ual level.
The study of determinants of micro-level corruption in the context of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, a country that is facing growing challenges in the areas of corruption,
migration and unemployment, is of particular importance. We contribute to the
growing body of research within correlation theories: that is, to the limited number
of studies of micro-level determinants of corruption (Islam & Lee, 2016; Hietikko,
2016; Razafindrakoto & Roubaud, 2007). In order to make anti-corruption measures
more effective, policy responses should target particular types of corruption, as ‘the
public administration literature has made little effort to explore such corruption
types’ (Jancsics, 2019, p. 2). Jancsics (2019) argues that a common understanding of
different types of corruption might help to develop more effective anti-corruption
strategies. In that sense, our paper contributes to the body of knowledge by examin-
ing the consistency of determinants of five forms of petty corruption: that is, corrup-
tion based on its location within different sectors of the economy. We also contribute
by analysing the relationship between the socio-demographic characteristics of an
individual and corruption experience.
Our research shows that corruption is a widespread phenomenon in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, with more educated people, people living in urban areas, and individu-
als with a higher income more likely to engage in bribery in several sectors. Measures
and policies aimed at reducing corrupt behaviour should be designed in a way that
considers the specific characteristics of these individuals. Diverse approaches may be
required for individuals with different socio-demographic characteristics, in order to
reduce the magnitude of micro-level corruption.
There were a few limitations to our study: we did not participate in the conceptu-
alisation and design of the survey, which meant that our dependent variable was
defined in a way that might implicate respondents. This may have caused an under-
estimation of the incidence of bribery. However, Measure BiH ensured that the data
collection process was conducted at the highest standard. It is worth noting that only
4–5% of respondents in each category did not answer the question about their
2688 J. MANGAFIĆ AND L. VESELINOVIĆ
involvement in corruption. However, it is possible that some forms of corruption
(such as giving gifts to doctors) were not directly reported as they might not have
been perceived as corruption by the client. Finally, due to a large amount of missing
data in each occupation category, we were unable to include occupational variables in
our models. This may have left us without an important predictor of bribery.
Further research is required in order to understand the consequences of bribing in
these five sectors of the economy, and future papers should consider including a var-
iety of explanatory variables. Interaction terms should be included in models to test if
the effect of one variable depends on the value of another. Longitudinal studies would
be especially useful. As corruption is so widespread, researchers should try to evaluate
the impact of existing policies and measures in place to reduce it.
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